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Waziristan rebellion (1948-1954)

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Waziristan rebellion (1948-1954)
Part of the Pashtunistan conflict and Pakistan-Afghanistan skirmishes
Location
Result

Failure to foment an extensive uprising[8]

  • Support for rebellion slowly diminishes[9][10]
  • Commander of rebellion surrenders[11][12]
  • End of Insurrection[11]
Territorial
changes
Datta Khel area of Waziristan recaptured by Pakistan
Belligerents

Faqir of Ipi's forces

Supported by
Afghanistan[1][2][3][4]
 India[3][5]
 Soviet Union[6][7]
(alleged)

Pakistan Pakistan
Forces involved:
 Pakistan Army

 Pakistan Air Force

ISI

Commanders and leaders
Faqir of Ipi
(Rebel leader)
Mehar Dil Surrendered[11][13]
(Second-in-Command)

Pakistan Liaqat Ali Khan
Ayub Khan

Leslie William
Strength
Unknown 40000+[14]
Casualties and losses
Military Compound destroyed
Several killed
Unknown

Waziristan rebellion was a rebellion by the Pashtun leader Faqir of Ipi to secede from Pakistan and establish a separate Pashtun state of Pashtunistan.

Historical background[edit]

Anglo-Afghan war's[edit]

First Anglo-Afghan War[edit]

British East India Company defeated the Sikhs during the Second Anglo-Sikh War in 1849, and incorporated small parts of the region into the Province of Punjab. While Peshawar was the site of a small revolt against British during the Mutiny of 1857, local Pashtun tribes throughout the region generally remained neutral or supportive of the British as they detested the Sikhs,[15]

In 1837, Lord Palmerston and John Hobhouse, fearing the instability of Afghanistan, the Sindh, and the increasing power of the Sikh kingdom to the northwest, raised the spectre of a possible Russian invasion of British India through Afghanistan. The British tended to misunderstand the foreign policy of the Emperor Nicholas I as anti-British and intent upon an expansionary policy in Asia.[16] The main goal of Nicholas's foreign policy was not the conquest of Asia, but rather upholding the status quo in Europe, especially by co-operating with Prussia and Austria, and in isolating France, as Louis Philippe I, the King of the French was a man whom Nicholas hated as an "usurper".[17]

Therefore instead of fixating on the oriental other, the East India Company played up the threat of the Russian bear".[18] British fears of a Persian and Afghan invasion of India took one step closer to becoming a reality when negotiations between the Afghans and Russians broke down in 1838. The Qajar dynasty of Persia, with Russian support, attempted the Siege of Herat.[19] Herat, in Afghanistan, is a city that had historically belonged to Persia; the Qajar shahs had long desired to take it back. It is located in a plain so fertile that is known as the "Granary of Central Asia"; whoever controls Herat and the surrounding countryside also controls the largest source of grain in all of Central Asia.[20]

On 1 October 1838, Lord Auckland issued the Simla Declaration attacking Dost Mohammed Khan for making "an unprovoked attack" on the empire of "our ancient ally, Maharaja Ranjeet Singh", going on to declare that Shuja Shah was "popular throughout Afghanistan" and would enter his former realm "surrounded by his own troops and be supported against foreign interference and factious opposition by the British Army".[21] The British denied that they were invading Afghanistan, claiming they were merely supporting its "legitimate" Shuja government "against foreign interference and factious opposition."[22] Shuja Shah by 1838 was barely remembered by most of his former subjects and those that did viewed him as a cruel, tyrannical ruler who, as the British were soon to learn, had almost no popular support in Afghanistan.[23]

This ultimately resulted in the First Anglo-Afghan War which resulted in the Emirate of Afghanistan emerging victor and caused heavy losses to the British and British East India Company caused retreat from Kabul.[24]

Second Anglo-Afghan War[edit]

After tension between Russia and Britain in Europe ended with the June 1878 Congress of Berlin, Russia turned its attention to Central Asia. That same summer, Russia sent an uninvited diplomatic mission to Kabul. Sher Ali Khan, the Amir of Afghanistan, tried unsuccessfully to keep them out. Russian envoys arrived in Kabul on 22 July 1878, and on 14 August, the British demanded that Sher Ali accept a British mission too.[25] The Amir not only refused to receive a British mission under Neville Bowles Chamberlain, but threatened to stop it if it were dispatched. Lord Lytton, the viceroy of India, ordered a diplomatic mission to set out for Kabul in September 1878 but the mission was turned back as it approached the eastern entrance of the Khyber Pass, triggering the Second Anglo–Afghan War.[26]

With British forces occupying Kabul, Sher Ali's son and successor, Yaqub Khan, signed the Treaty of Gandamak on 26 May 1879. According to this agreement and in return for an annual subsidy and vague assurances of assistance in case of foreign aggression, Yaqub relinquished control of Afghan foreign affairs to Britain. British representatives were installed in Kabul and other locations, and their control was extended to the Khyber and Michni passes, and Afghanistan ceded various North-West Frontier Province areas and Quetta to Britain which included the strategic fort of Jamrud. Yaqub Khan also renounced all rights to interfering in the internal affairs of the Afridi tribe. In return, Yaqub Khan who only received an annual subsidy of 600,000 rupees, with the British pledging to withdraw all forces from Afghanistan excluding Kandahar.[27][28] Ayub Khan, who had been serving as governor of Herat, rose in revolt, defeated a British detachment at the Battle of Maiwand in July 1880 and besieged Kandahar. Roberts then led the main British force from Kabul and decisively defeated Ayub Khan on 1 September at the Battle of Kandahar, bringing his rebellion to an end.[29] Despite this, no further trouble resulted between Afghanistan and British India during Rahman's period of rule. The Russians kept well out of Afghan internal affairs, with the exception of the Panjdeh incident three years later, resolved by arbitration and negotiation after an initial British ultimatum.[30]

The British ceded Kandahar to Afghanistan.[31] The Districts of Quetta, Pishin, Sibi, Harnai & Thal Chotiali ceded to British India[32] The war resulted in a British victory[33]

In 1893, Mortimer Durand was dispatched to Kabul by British India to sign an agreement with Rahman for fixing the limits of their respective spheres of influence as well as improving diplomatic relations and trade. On November 12, 1893, the Durand Line Agreement was reached. This led to the creation of a new North-West Frontier Province.

Third Anglo-Afghan war and Aftermath[edit]

Several princely states within the boundaries of the region were allowed to maintain their autonomy under the terms of maintaining friendly ties with the British. As the British war effort during World War One demanded the reallocation of resources from British India to the European war fronts, some tribesmen from Afghanistan crossed the Durand Line in 1917 to attack British posts in an attempt to gain territory and weaken the legitimacy of the border. The validity of the Durand Line, however, was re-affirmed in 1919 by the Afghan government with the signing of the Treaty of Rawalpindi,[34] which ended the Third Anglo-Afghan War.

Prelude[edit]

Durand line § Independence[edit]

During British rule in India in 1893, Mortimer Durand drew the Durand Line, fixing the limits of the spheres of influence between the Emirate of Afghanistan and British India during the Great Game and leaving about half of historical Pashtun territory under British colonial rule; after the partition of India, the Durand Line now forms the internationally recognized border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.[35]

In 1946, the Labour government in Britain, exhausted by recent events such as World War II and numerous riots, realized that it had neither the mandate at home, the support internationally, nor the reliability of the British Indian Army for continuing to control an increasingly restless British India. The reliability of the native forces for continuing their control over an increasingly rebellious India diminished, and so the government decided to end the British rule of the Indian Subcontinent.[36]: 167, 203 [37][38][39] In 1946, the Indian National Congress, being a secular party, demanded a single state.[40][41] The All India Muslim League, who disagreed with the idea of single state, stressed the idea of a separate Pakistan as an alternative.[42][43] On 14 August 1947, the new Dominion of Pakistan became independent and Muhammad Ali Jinnah was sworn in as its first governor general in Karachi.[44] Independence was marked with widespread celebration, but the atmosphere remained heated given the communal riots prevalent during independence in 1947.

In the frontier tribal zone, the element of decolonization raised more concerns than it answered, as it did in many other parts of the subcontinent. The tribal zone was technically attributed to Pakistan due to vague assurances, but it was unclear who would be in charge of the area's defense as well as its future political and economic growth. Some Pashtun chiefs, like Ghaffar Khan in the NWFP and the Faqir of Ipi in the tribal region, continued to oppose partition and Pakistan even though major jirgas eventually backed Pakistan.[45]

Declaration § opposition[edit]

On 21 June 1947, the Faqir of Ipi, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and other Khudai Khidmatgars held a jirga in Bannu during which they declared the Bannu Resolution, demanding that the Pashtuns be given a choice to have an independent state of Pashtunistan composing all Pashtun majority territories of British India, instead of being made to join the new dominions of India or Pakistan.[46] September 2, 1947,To foster tribal support for an independent Pashtunistan, the Faqir of Ipi and other rising leaders of the movement, like Malik Wali Khan of the Afridi tribesmen, organized a number of jirgas, the majority of which were held in Afghanistan but also on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. According to reports, the jirgas highlighted the pressing need of tribal collaboration and unity against Pakistan.[47]

The Pashtun and Baluch lands were included in Pakistan, Afghanistan strongly objected to UN without giving the locals a chance to exercise their right to self-determination. The Durrani monarchy expressed its opposition to Pakistan's UN admittance and assert irredentist claims to the Pashto-speaking regions of Pakistan's NWFP and Balochistan provinces.  a 'Pakhtunistan' flag was flown in Kabul alongside the national flag of Afghanistan on September 2, 1947.[48][47]

However, the British government refused to comply with the demand of the Bannu Resolution and only the options for Pakistan and India were given.[49][50]

Rebellion[edit]

The Faqir of Ipi rejected the creation of Pakistan after the partition of British India, considering Pakistan to have only come into existence at the insistence of the British.[51] In 1948, the Faqir of Ipi took control of North Waziristan's Datta Khel area and declared the establishment of an independent Pashtunistan, forming ties with regional leaders including Prince Mohammed Daoud Khan and other leaders.[52][53]

Timeline § events:[edit]

March 1949[edit]

During a reconnaissance 700 tribesmen were bombed by Two Pakistani jets, would return fire to thoose who had attacked them. Afghan media caught attention of the skirmish, which painted the meeting as a callous assault on Pashtun women and children, possibly without doing so. Remarkably, though, the tribesmen scattered rather than escalating into a more serious conflict.[54]

Mughalgai raid[edit]

In June 1949 a Pakistan Air Force warplane inadvertently bombed the Afghan village of Mughalgai on the Waziristan border with Afghanistan while chasing the Pashtunistan separatists who attacked Pakistani border posts from Afghanistan,this attack killed 23 people and further fuelled Afghan support for Pashtunistan.[55][56]

Gurwek Jirga[edit]

On 29 May 1949, the Faqir of Ipi called a tribal jirga in his headquarters of Gurwek and asked Pakistan to accept Pashtunistan as an independent state. He published a Pashto-language newspaper, Ghāzī, from Gurwek to promote his ideas.[57]Afghanistan also provided financial support to the Pashtunistan movement under the leadership of the Faqir of Ipi.[57] Faqir also established a rifle factory in Gurwek with the material support provided by the government of Afghanistan.[57]

In January 1950, a Pashtun loya jirga in Razmak symbolically appointed the Faqir of Ipi as the first president of the "National Assembly for Pashtunistan".[57]

1950 Clashes[edit]

  • On 30 September 1950, Pakistan claimed that Afghan troops and tribesmen had crossed into Pakistan's Balochistan, resulting in the Afghan invasion of Pakistan. The low-scale invasion was repelled after six days of fighting. The Afghan government denied its involvement and claimed that they were pro-Pashtunistan Pashtun tribesmen.[58]
  • on October 2, 1950 a clash resuled in minor casualties on both sides when tribal lashkar of Achakzai and Kakar tribesmen encountered Pakistani militia's[54]
  • In May 1 and 3, 1951, a force of 1,000 tribesmen attacked a village inside Pakistan, Killi Walijan, near Chaman.[59]
Covert Action Division[edit]

A group of die-hard persons from the militia and Gilgit scouts were trained. They formed the new directorate of ISI. Their main task was to counter the influence of Faqir of Ipi and to delay any Afghan incursion until the main force of the Pakistan Army arrives. Until November 1954, the CAD was mostly aimed to counter insurgency in Waziristan.

1953-54 Gurwek bombing campaign[edit]

In 1953–1954, the PAF's No. 14 Squadron led an operation from Miramshah airbase and heavily bombarded the Faqir of Ipi's compound in Gurwek.[57][60]

Decline § Aftermath[edit]

After sometime, the Faqir of Ipi relations with the government of Afghanistan deteriorated and he became aloof.[10] By this time, his movement had also started losing popular support. The Pashtun tribesmen were no longer willing to fight after the departure of British as the Faqir's reasoning of waging jihad against a foreign power was no longer considered valid.[10]

According to Elisabeth Leake, Dawn reported on a jirga of Utmanzai tribal leaders in Waziristan who decried the Faqir of Ipi, Declaring:

We tribesmen have cooperated with you the Faqir of Ipi in the past when you launched a Jihad against the imperialist encroachments of the British alien rulers. But today the Pakistan Government is our own Government. Your activities against Pakistan are, therefore, un- Islamic in concept and character and fraught with serious dangers to the unity and solidarity of the tribal people.[47]

Although he himself never surrendered until his death, his movement diminished after 1954 when his Commander-in-chief Mehar Dil Khan Khattak surrendered to the Pakistani authorities.[11][61]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Sultan M Hali. "Breaking the myths of Pakistan ruining Afghanistan". defence.pk. Archived from the original on 21 December 2023. Retrieved 2024-01-25.
  2. ^ Kaur 1985, p. 108-109.
  3. ^ a b Malik 2016, pp. 81–82.
  4. ^ Leake 2017, pp. 137–139.
  5. ^ Leake 2017, pp. 139–141.
  6. ^ "فقیر ایپی: جنگِ آزادی کا 'تنہا سپاہی' جس نے پاکستان کے خلاف ایک آزاد مملکت 'پختونستان' کے قیام کا اعلان کیا". BBC News (in Urdu). 7 September 2020. Archived from the original on 7 September 2020.
  7. ^ Shah, Farzana (2021-07-21). "Afghan Conflict & Pashtun Tahafuz Movement misplaced Pashtunistan romanticism". Voice of KP. Archived from the original on 2024-06-08. Retrieved 2024-06-08.
  8. ^ Leake 2017, p. 137.
  9. ^ Leake 2017, pp. 136–137.
  10. ^ a b c Mohammad Hussain Hunarmal. "The formidable Faqir". The News. Archived from the original on 13 February 2021.
  11. ^ a b c d Martel 2012, p. 712.
  12. ^ Sources :
  13. ^ Sources :
  14. ^ "faqir of ipi remembered on 115th anniversary". 17 April 2016.
  15. ^ "KP Historical Overview". Humshehri. Archived from the original on 11 March 2015. Retrieved 22 April 2015.
  16. ^ Riasanovsky, Nicholas Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959 p. 255.
  17. ^ Riasanovsky, Nicholas Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959 p. 258.
  18. ^ Husain, Farrukh (2018). Afghanistan in the age of empires: the great game for South and Central Asia. Silk Road Books. pp. 81, 412. ISBN 978-1-5272-1633-4.
  19. ^ Perry, James Arrogant Armies, Edison: CastleBooks, 2005 p. 110.
  20. ^ Perry, James Arrogant Armies, Edison: CastleBooks, 2005 pp. 110–11.
  21. ^ Perry, James Arrogant Armies, Edison: CastleBooks, 2005 p. 112.
  22. ^ Baxter, Craig (2001). "The First Anglo–Afghan War". In Federal Research Division, Library of Congress (ed.). Afghanistan: A Country Study. Baton Rouge, LA: Claitor's Pub. Division. ISBN 1-57980-744-5. Retrieved 23 September 2011.
  23. ^ Perry, James Arrogant Armies, Edison: CastleBooks, 2005 p. 112.
  24. ^ Cartwright, Mark. "First Anglo-Afghan War". World History Encyclopedia. Retrieved 2024-06-10.
  25. ^ Barthorp 2002, pp. 85–90.
  26. ^ Barthorp 2002, pp. 66–67.
  27. ^ Lee 2019, p. 365-366.
  28. ^ Barthorp 2002, p. 71.
  29. ^ Wilkinson-Latham 1977, pp. 16–17.
  30. ^ Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia By Clements, F. ABC-Clio, Santa Barbara, California, 2003 p. 198
  31. ^ Lee 2019, p. 378.
  32. ^ Blood 1996, pp. 20–21.
  33. ^ Schmidt, Karl J. (1995). An Atlas and Survey of South Asian History. M.E. Sharpe. p. 74. ISBN 978-1563243332. British forces were victorious and Sher Ali was deposed
  34. ^ Robson, Crisis on the Frontier pp. 136–7
  35. ^ Synovitz, Ron. "Controversial Proposal Of 'Pashtunistan'". RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty.
  36. ^ Metcalf, B.; Metcalf, T. R. (9 October 2006). A Concise History of Modern India (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-68225-1.
  37. ^ Hyam, Ronald (2006). Britain's declining empire: the road to decolonisation, 1918–1968. Cambridge University Press. p. 106. ISBN 978-0-521-68555-9. By the end of 1945, he and the Commander-in-chief, General Auckinleck were advising that there was a real threat in 1946 of large scale anti-British disorder amounting to even a well-organised rising aiming to expel the British by paralysing the administration.
    ...it was clear to Attlee that everything depended on the spirit and reliability of the Indian Army:"Provided that they do their duty, armed insurrection in India would not be an insoluble problem. If, however, the Indian Army was to go the other way, the picture would be very different.
    ...Thus, Wavell concluded, if the army and the police "failed" Britain would be forced to go. In theory, it might be possible to revive and reinvigorate the services, and rule for another fifteen to twenty years, but:It is a fallacy to suppose that the solution lies in trying to maintain the status quo. We have no longer the resources, nor the necessary prestige or confidence in ourselves.
  38. ^ Brown, Judith Margaret (1994). Modern India: the origins of an Asian democracy. Oxford University Press. p. 330. ISBN 978-0-19-873112-2. Archived from the original on 15 August 2020. Retrieved 15 November 2015. India had always been a minority interest in British public life; no great body of public opinion now emerged to argue that war-weary and impoverished Britain should send troops and money to hold it against its will in an empire of doubtful value. By late 1946 both Prime Minister and Secretary of State for India recognised that neither international opinion nor their own voters would stand for any reassertion of the raj, even if there had been the men, money, and administrative machinery with which to do so
  39. ^ Sarkar, Sumit (1983). Modern India, 1885–1947. Macmillan. p. 418. ISBN 978-0-333-90425-1. Archived from the original on 17 June 2016. Retrieved 15 November 2015. With a war weary army and people and a ravaged economy, Britain would have had to retreat; the Labour victory only quickened the process somewhat.
  40. ^ Raja Ram Mohun Roy, Keshab Chandra Sen, Surendranath Banerjea, V.O. Chidambaram Pillai, Srinivasa Ramanujan, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, Jayaprakash Narayan (1990). Remembering Our Leaders, Volume 3. Children's Book Trust. ISBN 9788170114871. The Indian National Congress and the nationalists of Bengal firmly opposed the partition.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  41. ^ Hanson, Eric O. (16 January 2006). Religion and politics in the international system today. Cambridge University Press. p. 200. ISBN 0-521-61781-2. Retrieved 9 December 2011.
  42. ^ Khan, Nyla Ali (2013). The Fiction of Nationality in an Era of Transnationalism. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-92304-4. Prior to the partition of India in 1947 into two separate nation-states, a group of Western-educated Indian Muslims who constituted the Muslim League, the pivotal Muslim political organization in undivided India, ardently advocated the logical of creating a separate homeland for Indian Muslims.
  43. ^ "South Asia | India state bans book on Jinnah". BBC News. 20 August 2009. Archived from the original on 13 March 2016. Retrieved 31 January 2012.
  44. ^ "A call to duty". Government of Pakistan. Archived from the original on 28 October 2006. Retrieved 7 January 2007.
  45. ^ Leake 2017, p. 103.
  46. ^ "past in perspective". 24 August 2019.
  47. ^ a b c Leake 2017, p. 136.
  48. ^ "Pashtunistan". www.globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 2024-06-10.
  49. ^ Marwat, Fazal-ur-Rahim Khan (1993). "North west frontier and rebellion".
  50. ^ Johnson, Thomas H.; Zellen, Barry (22 January 2014). Stanford University. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-8921-9.
  51. ^ Martel 2012, p. 711.
  52. ^ Martel 2012, pp. 711–712.
  53. ^ Hauner 1981, p. 207.
  54. ^ a b Leake 2017, p. 131.
  55. ^ "history of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations". 30 May 2019.
  56. ^ "Facts about the Durand line" (PDF).
  57. ^ a b c d e Ali, Zulfiqar (17 April 2016). "faqir of ipi remembered on 115th anniversary". Tribune. Archived from the original on 2022-10-19. Retrieved 17 April 2016.
  58. ^ "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 3 February 2017. Retrieved 19 November 2017.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  59. ^ Leake 2017, p. 135.
  60. ^ Rahim Nasar (16 April 2020). "Remembering the Faqir of Ipi". Asia Times.
  61. ^ Sources :

Sources[edit]